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Abstract
Consider a competitive bank whose illiquid asset portfolio is funded by
short-term debt that needs to be re￿nanced before the asset matures. In this
setting, we show that maximal transparency is not socially optimal, and that
the existence of social externalities of bank failures reduces further the optimal
level of transparency. Moreover, asset risk taking decreases as the level of
transparency decreases towards the socially optimal level. As for the sign of
the impact of transparency on re￿nancing risk, it is negative given the asset￿ s
risk, but it is ambiguous if we account for its indirect e⁄ect via risk taking.
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11 Introduction
Since Louis D. Brandeis￿article on Harper￿ s Weekly (December 20, 1913), enhanced
transparency is recurrently o⁄ered as a remedy for the problems of banking. Indeed,
a reaction to the recent global ￿nancial crisis has been the creation of a new interna-
tional banking regulatory framework (Basel III) that has as a key aim to strengthen
banks￿transparency and assure disclosure. However, the discussions on whether the
results of banks￿stress tests should be publicized, and on how stringent these tests
should be, suggests that the case for increasing transparency is not clear-cut ￿see
Landier and Thesmar 2011 for a survey of arguments in favor and against increasing
disclosure of ￿nancial information. In this paper we provide an analysis of the impact
of changes of the level of transparency on welfare, risk taking, and re￿nancing risk
for a competitive banking sector.
Consider a competitive bank whose illiquid asset portfolio is funded by short-
term debt supplied by risk-neutral creditors. The bank selects the level of asset risk
and the credit contract it o⁄ers. Creditors decide whether or not to roll over their
credit upon receiving a noisy signal of the probability that the asset will pay its
return. The bank￿ s asset portfolio is divisible and can be liquidated before maturity
incurring a cost. We show that under some natural parameter restrictions, given the
bank￿ s asset risk choice the creditor￿ s game has a unique equilibrium. We identify
the level transparency with the precision of creditors signals of the probability that
the bank￿ s asset will yield its return. Our comparative static analysis shows that
when the banking system is su¢ ciently transparent (i.e., when creditors￿signals are
su¢ ciently precise), further increasing the level of transparency reduces total welfare.
Thus, maximal transparency is not socially optimal.
In our setting there is no con￿ ict of interests between a bank and its creditors.
Thus, one may argue against a need for regulating the level of transparency since
competitive pressure should lead banks to select the socially optimal level. If there are
social externalities (i.e., if a bank failure involves social costs beyond those imposed
on the bank￿ s creditors) which may recommend regulating the level of transparency,
then we show that optimal regulation involves making banks more opaque rather
than more transparent.
In addition, we show that banks￿asset risk taking increases with the level of
2transparency above and around its socially optimal level. The impact of changes
in transparency on risk taking for levels of transparency su¢ ciently lower than the
socially optimal, however, is ambiguous. As for the sign of the e⁄ect of changes in
transparency on re￿nancing risk (i.e., on the probability that the bank will be able
to re￿nance its short-term debt), it is negative for a given level of asset risk, but is
ambiguous when we account for its indirect e⁄ect via risk taking.
A key element explaining our results is the existence of a negative externality that
arises when some creditors withdraw their credit: the liquidation costs that must be
assumed to pay back these creditors reduce the expected payo⁄ of the creditors who
roll over. Increasing transparency decreases the fraction of creditors￿who mistakenly
roll over as well as the fraction of those who mistakenly withdraw. Each of this
two types of errors has opposite e⁄ects on the payo⁄ of creditors who roll over,
but the net impact is negative due to the externality. Therefore, given the level of
risk, increasing transparency leads creditors to optimally raise their threshold to roll
over, and consequently impedes banks￿re￿nancing. Banks compensate this e⁄ect by
increasing risk taking, thus promising higher returns to those creditors who roll over.
These negative impacts of increasing transparency on welfare is counterbalanced by
fostering (discouraging) e¢ cient (ine¢ cient) liquidation.
Our model shares some features with the classical bank-run model of Diamond
and Dybvig (1983) and is hence related to the work in this tradition. Chari and
Jaggannathan (1988), Calomiris and Kahn (1991), Chen (1999) and Chen and Hasan
(2006), for example, study the role of creditors￿information at an interim stage in
generating information and panic-based bank runs, and observe it disciplining bank
behavior. In this literature, as in our model, creditors observe an interim signal
on the asset￿ s return before they decide whether or not to roll over their credit,
and withdrawals cause negative payo⁄ externalities. We, too, ￿nd that enhanced
transparency may decrease creditors￿willingness to roll over, but in our setting banks
may counter this e⁄ect by increasing risk taking. Another paper closely related to ours
is Chen and Hasan (2008) who, akin to our results, show that increasing (decreasing)
the precision of creditors￿signal of the asset￿ s return fosters e¢ cient (ine¢ cient)
liquidation, and increases the likelihood of a bank run when prospects are poor. This
paper, however, focuses on the Pareto dominant equilibrium, and neither studies the
3socially optimal level of transparency, nor does it deal with banks￿risk choice.
There is also a related literature on ex ante bank transparency initiated by Matutes
and Vives (1996) and Cordella and Yeyati (1998). This literature studies the impact
of information on creditors￿lending decisions and, ultimately, on banks￿risk choice.
Blum (2002) shows that enhanced transparency may increase banks￿risk taking if
banks can adjust their asset portfolio after obtaining funding. While we model asset
risk taking in a similar fashion as in these papers, we study the impact of interim
transparency. We ￿nd that enhanced transparency may increase risk taking even if
banks can commit to their asset portfolio choice.
Our paper also has a connection to the literature studying transparency regulation
and ￿nancial market liquidity - see, e.g., Dang, Gorton, and Holmstr￿m (2009) and
Pagano and Volpin (2010). While we do not model liquidity provision explicitly, we
show that enhanced transparency has an adverse direct e⁄ect on banks￿possibilities
to roll over its short-term funding.
Since transparency hinges on incomplete information, and since banks are in-
herently vulnerable to self-ful￿lling runs, theoretical models of bank transparency
easily generate multiple equilibria, which often render comparative statics and wel-
fare analyses inconclusive. While the literature on bank runs has been in￿ uential in
pointing out the importance of creditors con￿dence and its dependence on creditors￿
expectations, it does not allow an assessment of how con￿dence relates to the level of
creditors￿information. Our result on uniqueness of equilibrium builds on the theory
of global games, and is closely related to Morris and Shin (1998). Uniqueness of
equilibrium allows us to explicitly compute the volume of credit roll over, facilitating
comparative statics and welfare analyses exercises. In this respect, our paper relates
to other papers that use global game methodology to study the problems of banking
and lending such as Rochet and Vives (2004), Goldstein and Pauzner (2005), Huang
(2011), and more closely to Morris and Shin (2006) who study the roll over decisions
of government debt. While most of the papers in this literature deal with a binary
action game, in our setting, similarly to Morris and Shin (2006), we have to deal
with an agent (the bank) whose decisions (risk choice) a⁄ect the support of creditors￿
signals.
In the global game literature, the impact of the level of information on equilibrium
4has been extensively studied. In a pioneering work, Morris and Shin (2002) study the
value of public information in a setting reminiscent of a beauty contest, in which the
payo⁄of an agent depends on how well the agent is able to guess the state and on the
level of conformity. They provide conditions under which the social value of public
information is negative. They conclude that the social value of public information
is negative whenever its precision is low relative to the precision of agents￿private
information. In their model, the detrimental e⁄ect of public information arises from
the coordination motive that drives agents￿actions, which leads agents to overreact to
public information. The signi￿cance and interpretation of Morris and Shin (2002)￿ s
results has been debated by, among others, Angeletos and Pavan (2004), Hellwig
(2005), and Svensson (2006). In particular, Angeletos and Pavan (2004) study a model
where conformity plays no role and coordination is socially bene￿cial, and conclude
that welfare unambiguously increases with the precision of public information.
We depart from these papers in that we study the impact of transparency by ex-
amining directly the e⁄ect on equilibrium of changes in the precision of agents￿private
signals, avoiding the complication of dealing with an additional noisy public signal,
which given our distributional assumptions provides no interesting insights. In other
words, we identify the level of transparency with the precision of creditors￿private
information. Alternative levels of transparency may result from speci￿c regulation on
how much information about their asset portfolios banks must disclose to their credi-
tors. We may also interpret that bank transparency is a⁄ected by public disclosures,
e.g. by the disclosure policy on banks￿stress tests. Our results contrast with those
of Angeletos and Pavan (2004) in that we ￿nd that welfare does not monotonically
increases with transparency, even though in our setting, like in theirs, conformity
does not play a role.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we layout the basic setting. In
section 3 we describe the creditors￿game. In section 4 we prove that creditors￿game
has a unique equilibrium, which we show is the solution to a simple equation. In
Section 5 we study the impact of transparency given the asset risk. Section 6 studies
the banks￿risk choice. In Section 7 we extend our welfare analysis. The Appendix
presents some calculations used to derive our results.
52 The Model
We consider a competitive bank whose illiquid asset portfolio is funded by short-term
credit that needs to be re￿nanced. The bank￿ s asset pays at maturity a return of
1+R > 1 with probability p and zero with probability 1￿p; where p; the probability
of success, is drawn from a uniform distribution on [1￿￿;1]. The parameter ￿ 2 (0;1)
captures the level of risk of the asset: the larger ￿ the more likely it is that the asset
pays no return. (Naturally, the asset￿ s return R will generally depend on the level of
risk ￿: In this section we take ￿; and therefore R; as given, but we endogenize the
bank￿ s choice of risk ￿ in Section 6.) Thus, the return of the asset is (1 + R)p; which
is distributed uniformly on [(1 ￿ ￿)(1 + R);1 + R]: The mean return is
Q := E ((1 + R)p) = (1 + R)E(p);
where
E(p) = 1 ￿
￿
2
is the mean probability of success. The bank￿ s asset portfolio is divisible and can be
liquidated before maturity: one unit of the asset liquidated before maturity yields ￿
monetary units. We assume that
Q > 1 > ￿ > 0; (1)
which implies that liquidating the asset before maturity is both costly and ex-ante
ine¢ cient.
The bank has a continuum of creditors, whose measure is normalized to one,
each of whom has one unit of uninsured credit. Creditors are risk neutral (i.e., they
maximize expected returns). Hence, in contrast to many bank run models, in our
setting risk-sharing is not an issue. A fraction h > 0 of creditors are active and may
withdraw their credit before the asset matures. The remaining fraction of creditors,
1 ￿ h, maintain their unit of credit until the asset matures, and therefore play a
passive role. Henceforth we refer to the active creditors simply as creditors when
no confusion may arise. The assumption that only a fraction of creditors are active
captures the fact that some of the bank￿ s loans (e.g., long-term retail deposits) are
stickier than others (e.g., wholesale funding from the overnight interbank market).
6We assume that
h < ￿; (2)
which implies that the bank is always liquid, i.e., the bank does not fail even if all
active creditors withdraw their credit. (The bank only fails when the realized return
of the asset is zero.) Although the bank is always liquid, condition (1) implies that
ex ante it is in a creditor￿ s (and society￿ s) interest to roll over. These simplifying
assumptions allow for an analysis focused on the impact of transparency on risk
taking, re￿nancing risk, and welfare.
Each creditor observes a noisy signal of the realized probability of success p;
si = p + ￿i;
where the noise terms ￿i are conditionally independently and uniformly distributed on
[￿";"]; for some " > 0: Then all creditors simultaneously decide whether to withdraw
or to roll over their credit. Note that although creditors information about the state
di⁄ers, no creditor has superior information.
The timing of the game that active creditors face is as follows: (1) The bank o⁄ers
a credit contract; (2) nature draws the success probability p from [1 ￿ ￿;1]; (3) each
creditor observes a noisy signal s of the realized value of p; and then decides whether
to withdraw or to roll over her credit; (4) the returns are realized and the creditors
are compensated according to the credit contract.
3 The Creditors Game
In the creditors game, a strategy for a creditor is a mapping from the set of signals
[1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ";1 + "] into the set of actions {roll over, withdraw}. The payo⁄ to a
creditor depends on the state p; and the fraction of all creditors who withdraw,
which we denote by x 2 [0;h]. Following the tradition of Diamond and Dybvig
(1983) we focus on contracts where each creditor gets at least her money back if she
withdraws her credit, whereas a creditor who rolls over becomes a residual claimant; in
equilibrium, competition forces the bank to promise to pay their money back exactly
to the creditors who withdraw, as well as the entire asset￿ s returns to the creditors
7who roll over.1 Thus, our assumption that h < ￿ implies that the payo⁄to a creditor
who withdraws is 1; whatever may be the state and the fraction of creditors who
withdraw. (Note that a creditor who withdraws gets more than the liquidation value










Since ￿ < 1; then @u(p;x)=@x < 0 and @2u(p;x)=@x2 < 0; that is, withdrawals
cause a negative externality on those who roll over, and the size of this externality is
increasing in the fraction of creditors who withdraw. Obviously, the payo⁄ to rolling
over increases with the probability of success, i.e., @u(p;x)=@p > 0: These properties
play an important role in establishing our key results.
A pro￿le of creditors￿strategies may be described by a strategy distribution ￿ that
for each signal s 2 [1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ";1 + "] provides the fraction of active creditors that
withdraw their credit upon receiving the signal s; ￿(s) 2 [0;1] . Given a strategy
distribution ￿ the fraction of all creditors who withdraw if the state is p is
x(p;￿) = hE (￿(s)jp); (4)
and the expected payo⁄ to a creditor who rolls over when her signal is s is
U(s;￿) = E(u(￿;x(￿;￿))js);
where pjs is the probability of success conditional on signal s, which is distributed
uniformly on [1 ￿ ￿;1] \ [s ￿ ";s + "] = [maxf1 ￿ ￿;s ￿ "g;minf1;s + "g]: Note that
the upper and lower bounds of this interval are both increasing in s: Since u(p;x) is
continuous, then U(s;￿) is continuous. Also note that if ￿;^ ￿ satisfy ^ ￿(s) ￿ ￿(s) for
all s; then
x(p;^ ￿) = hE (^ ￿(s)jp) ￿ hE (￿(s)jp) = x(p;￿)
1Alternatively, we may reinterpret our model, in line with Rochet and Vives (2004), as if all the
credit is initially at the banks, with a nominal value pre-determined and normalized to unity in case
of a withdrawal. The banks then compete for renewals of these credits by o⁄ering rates of returns
to the creditors who rollover.
8for all p 2 [1 ￿ ￿;1], and therefore, since u is decreasing in x, we have
U(s;^ ￿) ￿ U(s;￿):
A strategy distribution ￿ is an equilibrium of the creditors￿game if for all s 2
[1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ";1 + "]; U(s;￿) < 1 implies ￿(s) = 1; and U(s;￿) > 1 implies ￿(s) = 0;
i.e., the strategy pro￿le de￿ning the strategy distribution ￿ is such that (almost) all
active creditors follow an optimal strategy.
Under complete information, i.e., when creditors observe the probability of success
with no error (" = 0), since u is continuous and decreasing in x, if u(1;h) > 1 then
for p near one we have
u(p;x) ￿ u(p;h) > 1:
Hence in the subgames where p is near one, rolling over is a strictly dominant strategy
and equilibrium is unique. Likewise, if u(1￿￿;0) < 1; then for p near 1￿￿ we have
u(p;x) ￿ u(p;0) < 1:
Hence in the subgames where p is near 1 ￿ ￿; withdrawing is dominant strategy
and equilibrium is unique.2 However, the subgames corresponding to intermediate
values of p; i.e., values such that u(p;h) < 1 < u(p;0), a creditor￿ s optimal action
depends on the fraction of creditors who roll over, and therefore depending on which
action creditors coordinate on di⁄erent equilibria arise ￿e.g., there is an equilibrium
in which all creditors coordinate on withdrawing, and another equilibrium in which
all creditors coordinate on rolling over. This multiplicity of equilibrium arising from
coordination is common in models of banking.
Under incomplete information (i.e., when " > 0), the existence of dominance or
contagious regions as those described above, in which a creditor￿ s optimal behavior
does not depend on the actions of the other creditors, implies uniqueness of equilib-
rium. We derive some natural parameter restrictions that guarantee the existence of
these dominance regions.
The existence of an upper dominance region requires the existence of an interval
of su¢ ciently high signals of the probability of success that a creditor￿ s optimal action
2The inequalities u(1 ￿ ￿;0) < 1 < u(1;h) are implied by conditions (5) and (7) below.
9is to roll over her credit, even if all the other active creditors withdraw (i.e., x = h).
Speci￿cally, if the inequality
(￿ ￿ h)
￿(1 ￿ h)
(1 + R)(1 ￿ ") > 1 (5)
holds, then the expected payo⁄ to a creditor who rolls over when her signal is s >
1 ￿ " is








(1 + R)(1 ￿ ")
> 1;
i.e., the expected payo⁄ to rolling over is greater than the expected payo⁄ to with-
drawing regardless of what the other active creditors do. Hence a creditor getting
a signal s > 1 ￿ " rolls over. Since Q > 1 implies that 1 + R > 1; the inequality
(5) holds when " is small and ￿h is su¢ ciently close h: The di⁄erence ￿h ￿ h is the
maximum (negative) externality of withdrawals on the payo⁄ of the creditors who
roll over, which is smaller the closer is ￿ (resp. h) to one (resp. zero).3
The existence of a lower dominance region requires that there be an interval of
su¢ ciently low signals of the probability of success that a creditor￿ s optimal action is
to withdraw even if everyone else rolls over (i.e., x = 0). Speci￿cally, if the inequality
(1 + R)(1 ￿ ￿ + ") < 1 (7)
holds, then the expected payo⁄ to a creditor who rolls over when her signal is s <
1 ￿ ￿ + " is
E(u(￿;x)js) ￿ E(u(￿;0)js) (8)
= (1 + R)E(pjs)
￿ (1 + R)(1 ￿ ￿ + ")
< 1;
3As is clear from condition (5), assumption (2) is needed for the existence of the upper dominance
region. For the same reason, Goldstein and Pauzner (2005) assume that premature liquidations do
not reduce asset returns and Huang (2011) assumes suspension of convertibility.
10i.e., the expected payo⁄to withdrawing is greater than the expected payo⁄to rolling
over regardless of what the other active creditors do. Hence a creditor getting a signal
s < 1 ￿ ￿ + " withdraws. In essence, (7) implies that the return distribution must
have a su¢ ciently wide support to allow for net-present values below 1 even though
the ex-ante expected return of the asset is above 1.
Henceforth we assume that




￿ (1 ￿ ￿);1 ￿
￿(1 ￿ h)
(1 + R)(￿ ￿ h)
￿
: (9)
This inequality warrants that conditions (5) and (7) hold. We show that under this
assumption the creditors￿game has a unique equilibrium.
4 Equilibrium of the Creditors Game
A simple class of strategies is that of switching strategies, whereby a creditor with-
draws if her signal is below a threshold t 2 [1￿￿￿";1+"]; and rolls over otherwise.
When all creditors follow the same switching strategy identi￿ed by a threshold t; then
we denote by ￿t the resulting strategy distribution, which is given by ￿t(s) = 1 if s < t;
and ￿t(s) = 0 otherwise. Also we write V (s;t) := U(s;￿t): Since ￿^ t(s) ￿ ￿t(s) when-
ever ^ t ￿ t; then V (s;t) is decreasing in t: Moreover, since ￿t is decreasing in s; then
x(s;￿t) is decreasing in s, and therefore the payo⁄to rolling over, u(s;x(s;￿t)); is in-
creasing in s; hence V (s;t) is increasing in s. We establish below that V (t;t) (i.e., the
restriction of V to the diagonal) is strictly increasing on the interval [1￿￿+";1￿"]:
Note that the inequalities (1) and (7) jointly imply that
(1 + R)(1 ￿ ￿ + ") < 1 < Q = (1 + R)(1 ￿ ￿=2);
i.e.,
2" < ￿:
Hence 1 ￿ ￿ + " < 1 ￿ ", so that the interval [1 ￿ ￿ + ";1 ￿ "] is non-empty.
For t ￿ 1 ￿ " the inequality (6) implies
V (t;t) = E(u(￿;x(￿;￿t))jt) > 1:
11Likewise, for t ￿ 1 ￿ ￿ + " the inequality (8) implies
V (t;t) = E(u(￿;x(￿;￿t))jt) < 1:
Hence there is a unique t￿ 2 (1 ￿ ￿ + ";1 ￿ ") such that V (t￿;t￿) = 1: Moreover, the
strategy distribution ￿t￿ is an equilibrium: Since V is increasing in s; if
V (s;t
￿) = U(s;￿t￿) < 1 = V (t
￿;t
￿);
then s < t￿; and therefore ￿t￿(s) = 1; and if
V (s;t
￿) = U(s;￿t￿) > 1 = V (t
￿;t
￿);
then s > t￿ and ￿t￿(s) = 0: We establish that in fact ￿t￿ is the unique equilibrium of
the creditors￿game.
Proposition 1. The creditors￿game has a unique equilibrium. Moreover, in equi-
librium all creditors follow the threshold strategy ￿t￿; where t￿ 2 (1 ￿ ￿ + ";1 ￿ ") is
the unique solution to the equation V (t;t) = 1:
Proof. The proof follows the lines of Morris and Shin (1998)￿ s Lemma 3. Assume
that ￿ is an equilibrium strategy distribution, and de￿ne
s := inffs j ￿(s) < 1g;
and
￿ s := supfs j ￿(s) > 0g:
Then
￿ s ￿ supfs j 0 < ￿(s) < 1g ￿ inffs j 0 < ￿(s) < 1g ￿ s:
Since ￿ is an equilibrium and U is continuous, then
U(s;￿) ￿ 1 ￿ U(￿ s;￿):
Consider the strategy distribution ￿s: We have ￿(s) ￿ ￿s(s) for all s; and therefore
V (s;s) = U(s;￿s) ￿ U(s;￿) ￿ 1 = V (t
￿;t
￿):
Since V (t;t) is increasing, then t￿ ￿ s:
12Likewise, consider the strategy distribution ￿ ￿ s: We have ￿ ￿ s(s) ￿ ￿(s) for all s; and
therefore
V (￿ s; ￿ s) = U(￿ s;￿ ￿ s) ￿ U(￿ s;￿) ￿ 1 = V (t
￿;t
￿):
Since V (t;t) is increasing, then ￿ s ￿ t￿:
Thus, ￿ s = s = t￿; and therefore ￿(s) = ￿t￿(s) for all s: ￿
By Proposition 1, in equilibrium all creditors follow the same threshold strategy.
Moreover, the equilibrium threshold belongs to the interval [1￿￿+";1￿"] and solves
the equation V (t;t) = 1: We calculate the function V (s;t). When all active creditors
follow the threshold strategy t 2 [1￿￿+";1￿"]; then the expected fraction of active









(t ￿ p + ");
for intermediate values p 2 (t ￿ ";t + "). Hence, using equation (4) we can calculate





0 if p 2 [t + ";1];
h
2"
(t ￿ p + ") if p 2 (t ￿ ";t + ");
h if p 2 [1 ￿ ￿;t ￿ "]:
(10)
If a creditor signal is s 2 [1 ￿ ￿ + ";1 ￿ "]; then pjs is distributed uniformly on























Evaluating the integrals in this expression, and setting a creditor￿ s signal equal to
the threshold t, we obtain the function V (t;t): This is a tedious task that we relegate









[2h + (2 ￿ h)ln(1 ￿ h)];
and
￿ := h + (1 ￿ ￿)ln(1 ￿ h):







i.e., V (t;t) is strictly increasing in t.
































Since t￿ 2 (1￿￿+";1￿"); using equations (10) we calculate the equilibrium ex-ante
expected fraction of creditors who withdraw,
x




￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)): (14)
Note that x￿ 2 (h"=￿;h(￿ ￿ ")=￿).4 Proposition 2 below states these results.
Proposition 2. The equilibrium threshold is t￿ = (￿h=(1 + R) ￿ ￿")=￿ and the
ex-ante expected fraction of creditors who withdraw is x￿ = h(t￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿))=￿; where
￿ = ￿(1 ￿ ￿)[2h + (2 ￿ h)ln(1 ￿ h)]=h > 0 and ￿ = h + (1 ￿ ￿)ln(1 ￿ h) > 0:
4Following Goldstein and Pauzner (2005), (t￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿))=￿ = 1￿(1 ￿ t￿)=￿ may be interpreted
as the ex ante limiting probability of a bank run (as " ! 0). With this interpretation, x￿ is the
fraction of active creditors times the probability that an agent runs on the bank.
145 The E⁄ects of Transparency Given Asset Risk
In this section we study the e⁄ect of transparency on re￿nancing risk (i.e., on the ex
ante expected fraction of creditors who withdraw x￿), and on welfare. In this ￿rst
pass, we continue treating the level of asset risk ￿ as exogenous, focusing on the e⁄ect
of transparency on banks￿liabilities.
Changes in the level of transparency may be associated with the release of public
information regarding banks￿asset portfolios. The literature has studied the impact
on equilibrium outcomes of the introduction of a noisy public signal. Notably, in a
beauty contest setup in which the payo⁄ of an agent depends on how well the agent
is able to guess the state and on the level of conformity of her guess and the guesses
of the other agents, Morris and Shin (2002) show that if the precision of the public
signal relative to that of the agents￿private signals is below (above) a threshold, then
public information has a negative (positive) e⁄ect on welfare. Angeletos and Pavan
(2004) show, however, that if conformity plays no role and coordination is socially
bene￿cial, then it is the overall precision of agents information that in￿ uences the
agents￿actions and determines the equilibrium outcome, and conclude that public
information always has a bene￿cial e⁄ect.
We identify the level of transparency with the precision of creditors￿private signals
of the probability of success, i.e., with the value of ": Smaller values of " correspond
to greater levels of transparency, and vice versa. What we have in mind is that
alternative levels of transparency may result from regulating how much information
about asset portfolios banks must disclose to their creditors. Such disclosures need not
be public, but privately communicated to the creditors. Our approach allows studying
the impact of changes in transparency via comparative static analysis, avoiding the
complication of adding an additional noisy public signal. Nevertheless, given our
distributional assumptions, the introduction of a public signal whose distribution is
also uniform and independent of the creditors private signal, e.g., the disclosure of
the results of banks￿stress tests, would have an impact on equilibrium akin to that
of a discrete increase on the precision of creditors￿signals, and therefore provide
no additional insights. For simplicity, we assume that changes in " have no impact
on bank￿ s costs ￿see Landier and Thesmar 2011 for a description of the costs of
transparency, and Hyytinen and Takalo 2002 for an analysis of their implications for
15bank stability.
In order to evaluate the impact of " on re￿nancing risk (i.e., on x￿), it is ￿rst
instructive to study the impact of " on the fraction of creditors who withdraw for a
given p: Taking derivatives in equation (10) makes it clear that the sign of @x(p;￿t)=@"
is the same as that of (p￿t); that is, the fraction of creditors who withdraw increases
with the level of transparency (i.e., as " becomes smaller) when the probability of
success is high relative to the threshold for withdrawal (i.e., p > t), and vice versa.
This is intuitive: as " decreases, choosing the optimal action becomes more likely;
that is, a creditor is more likely to roll over (withdraw) when the true value of p is
above (below) the threshold t. In this sense, increasing transparency has procyclical
e⁄ects, facilitating re￿nancing when the prospects of getting the asset returns are
good, but impeding re￿nancing when they are bad.
The e⁄ect of transparency on re￿nancing risk through the cycle is given by the
derivative @x￿=@". Equation (14) makes it clear that x￿ depends on " only indirectly







Hence the equilibrium threshold t￿ increases with the level of transparency; i.e., the
more precise are the creditors￿signals (i.e., the smaller is "), the larger is the creditors￿









Hence the ex ante expected fraction of creditors who withdraw increases with the
level of transparency; i.e., the more precise are the creditors￿signals (i.e., the smaller
is "), the larger is re￿nancing risk x￿. We state this result in Proposition 3 below.
Proposition 3. Given the level of asset risk ￿; increasing the level of transparency
(i.e., decreasing ") increases re￿nancing risk (i.e., increases x￿).
Proposition 3 is a direct implication of the fact that V (t;t) is increasing in " ￿see
(12). The intuition of this property is as follows: As discussed above, for a given p
the e⁄ects of increasing transparency (i.e., decreasing ") on the fraction of creditors
who withdraw x(p;￿t) are procyclical, i.e., x decreases when p > t and increases
16when p < t: Hence its e⁄ects on u(p;x) are countercyclical, i.e., if " decreases, then u
increases when p > t and decreases when p < t. That is, increasing transparency has
a negative (positive) impact on the expected payo⁄of a creditor who rolls over since it
decreases the fraction of creditors￿who mistakenly roll over (withdraw). Nevertheless,
the externality of withdrawals on the payo⁄ of creditors who roll over (which arises
because liquidations are costly, i.e., ￿ < 1) makes the negative e⁄ect more pronounced
than the positive e⁄ect, so that the net e⁄ect is negative. (Mathematically, this result
hinges on the fact that ￿ < 1 implies @u(p;x)=@x < 0 and @u(p;x)=@x2 < 0:) Hence
a decrease of " prompts the creditors to optimally raise their threshold to roll over
their credit.
The equilibrium fraction of creditors who roll over, 1 ￿ x￿; may also be inter-
preted as a measure of creditors￿con￿dence on banks. By Proposition 3, increasing
transparency has a negative e⁄ect on creditors￿con￿dence. The comparative statics
of creditors￿con￿dence with respect to other exogenous parameters, such as ￿ and
h; are complex. However, it is straightforward to show that @2x￿=@"@￿ > 0; i.e.,
the larger the liquidation value of the asset, the smaller is the negative impact of
transparency on creditors￿con￿dence. This again hinges on the (absolute) value of
the derivative @2u(p;x)=@x2; which is proportional to (1 ￿ ￿).
Let us now study the impact of transparency on welfare given the asset￿ s risk.
Since competitive banks promise the full asset returns to creditors, social welfare W




















Here x(p;￿t￿) is the total payo⁄to the creditors who withdraw and get their monetary
unit, and (1 ￿ x(p;￿t￿)=￿)(1 + R)p is the returns of the non-liquidated assets, which
is also the total payo⁄ to the creditors who roll over.
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Since 0 < ￿ < h and ￿ > 0; then a > 0. Hence @W=@" > 0 (i.e., W is increasing)
when " is smaller than a=b: In particular, @W=@" > 0 if " = 0. And @W=@" < 0 (i.e.,
W is decreasing) for " larger than a=b. That is, when creditors￿signals are very noisy,
social welfare increases with the level of transparency. When creditors￿signals are
very precise, however, social welfare decreases with the level of transparency. Hence
maximal transparency is not socially optimal.
We summarize these ￿ndings in Proposition 4 below.
18Proposition 4. Given the level of asset risk ￿; social welfare decreases with the level
of transparency when the level of transparency is high, but increases when it is low,
i.e., @W=@" R 0 when " Q a=b: Thus, maximal transparency is not socially optimal.
Even though increasing transparency impedes re￿nancing of banks￿liabilities by
Proposition 3, its impact on welfare is counterbalanced by reducing creditors￿mis-
takes, which are costly for individual creditors and, when they lead to ine¢ cient liq-
uidation, involve negative externalities. In addition, increasing transparency fosters
e¢ cient liquidations when the realized value of p is very low, i.e., when p ￿ ￿=(1+R).
These counterbalancing e⁄ects favor an intermediate level of transparency "￿ = a=b;
provided that it is feasible (i.e., a=b < ￿ " as given by condition (9)).
Proposition 4 implies that if a=b > ￿ "; social welfare decreases with transparency on
(0;￿ "). (Recall that " 2 (0;￿ ") by assumption.) Thus, the optimal level of transparency
may be the minimal feasible level. Note the role of the restriction on the value "
in guaranteeing uniqueness of equilibrium. If " were above ", multiple equilibria
arise, and the banking system becomes vulnerable to self-ful￿lling crises. In the
literature, this rational has suggested regulation to warrant a su¢ ciently high level
of transparency to prevent these self-ful￿lling crises from arising ￿see, e.g., Rochet
and Vives (2004). In our setup, this argument may favor a more transparent banking
system than that implied by " = a=b; since the latter may be e¢ cient but vulnerable
to self-ful￿lling crises; that is, this argument suggests that the socially optimal level
of transparency is "￿ = minfa=b;￿ "g > 0.
Summarizing, the socially optimal level of transparency is below the maximal,
and may be the minimal level that guarantees that self-ful￿lling crises do not arise.
6 Asset Risk Taking
In order to endogenize asset risk, we assume that banks choose the level of risk
￿; which together with all the other aspects of the credit contract o⁄ered becomes
common knowledge. Competition then forces banks to choose the level of asset risk
￿ that maximizes the creditors￿welfare, in addition to paying the full asset returns
to the creditors who roll over.
Let us write the asset￿ s return conditional on success, as well as the mean asset
19return, explicitly as a function of ￿; i.e.,
Q(￿) = (1 + R(￿))E (p(￿)):
Note that the expected probability of success, E(p(￿)) = 1 ￿ ￿=2, decreases with ￿:










i.e., the return conditional on success is strictly increasing with the level of risk.5
Recall that our proof of existence and uniqueness of equilibrium given the level of
risk involves the condition " < ￿ "; where ￿ " is given by condition (9), which shows how
￿ " depends on the level of risk ￿ both directly and via the return function R: In order
to guarantee existence and uniqueness of equilibrium for all ￿ 2 [￿; ￿ ￿]; where ￿ > 0









We proceed under the assumption that the solution to this problem is interior, i.e.,




and that W satis￿es the the second order su¢ cient condition for welfare maximization
@2W
@￿2 ￿ 0: (18)
Note that if ￿￿ is a corner solution, then transparency has no impact on the banks￿
asset risk choice.
5If Q is a mean-preserving spread, i.e., Q0 (￿) = 0, a case often studied in the literature, e.g.,
Matutes and Vives (1996), Cordella and Yeyati (1998), then R0 (￿) = (1 + R(￿))=(2 ￿ ￿) > 0:
20Let us consider the impact of transparency on the level of risk chosen by banks.































































Since R0 > 0; then the second term on the RHS of (19) is negative. As for the
￿rst term, it is negative for " < a=b; and it is positive for " > a=b: Thus, if " ￿ a=b;
then @W 2=@"@￿ < 0; whereas if " > a=b; then the sign @W 2=@"@￿ is ambiguous.
Therefore if the level of transparency decreases towards the socially optimal level,
i.e., if " approaches a=b from below, then risk taking increases; i.e., d￿￿=d" < 0 on
(0;a=b]. In particular, if " is around its optimal value of a=b; then risk taking increases
with the level of transparency. However, if " is well above its optimal value (assuming
such levels are feasible, i.e. condition (17) is not violated), then the impact of in-
creasing transparency towards the socially optimal level on risk taking is ambiguous.
We state these results in Proposition 5 below.
Proposition 5. Banks￿ asset risk taking increases with the level of transparency
above and around the socially optimal level, i.e., d￿￿=d" < 0 for " ￿ a=b. For levels
of transparency su¢ ciently low, however, the impact of transparency on risk taking
is ambiguous.
21Recall that more risk taking (i.e., a greater value of ￿) is associated with a larger
probability of a bank failure in our model. Thus, Proposition 5 implies that for high
levels of transparency and for the levels of transparency around its optimal value
increasing the level of transparency increases the probability of a bank failure, i.e.,
d￿￿=d" < 0. This holds for all " 2 (0;￿ ") when, e.g., a=b ￿ ￿ ". More generally, even
if " is well above a=b; then d￿￿=d" < 0 may hold since the second term on the RHS
of (19) is negative. In fact, we can show that if the elasticity of asset returns with
respect to the level of risk is above one, then d￿￿=d" < 0 for all " 2 (0;￿ "): An
increase in transparency makes creditors less willing to roll over for a given asset risk
(Proposition 3); this leads banks to compensate this e⁄ect by taking more risk: From





￿ (1 + R)
2 < 0; (20)
i.e., the creditors￿threshold for rolling over decreases with the bank￿ s asset risk. The
e⁄ect is due to the expected asset returns at maturity being increasing in the risk
level (i.e., Q0 ￿ 0), implying that the expected payo⁄ of creditors who roll over is
increasing in the risk level (see (3)).
As for the impact of changes in the level of transparency on the level of re￿nancing
risk x is now twofold: there is a direct e⁄ect on banks re￿nancing risk given the banks￿













By Proposition 3, the direct e⁄ect @x￿=@" is negative. For the sign of the indirect
e⁄ect, d￿￿=d" < 0 for a wide range of parameter values by Proposition 5, and in fact
may hold for all " 2 (0;￿ "). For simplicity, in the following discussion we concentrate
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is the elasticity of the equilibrium threshold with respect to the asset risk. Note from
(20) that ￿ is positive.
22Since t￿ 2 (1 ￿ ￿ + ";1 ￿ ") by Proposition 1, then 1 ￿ t￿ > 0: However, the sign
1￿t￿ (1 + ￿) is ambiguous and, by implication, the sign of the indirect e⁄ect @x￿=@￿
is ambiguous too. If ￿ is small, then @x￿=@￿ > 0, and the sign of both the indirect
e⁄ect and total e⁄ect are negative.
Proposition 6. If the elasticity of the equilibrium threshold with respect to asset risk
is su¢ ciently small, then increasing the level of transparency increases re￿nancing
risk around and above its socially optimal level. Otherwise, the e⁄ect of changes in
the level of transparency on re￿nancing risk is ambiguous.
Transparency has potentially ambiguous e⁄ects on re￿nancing risk because the
impact of asset risk taking on withdrawals (@x￿=@￿) is ambiguous due to two oppos-
ing forces. On the one hand, the probability that creditors get low signals of p and
withdraw increases with risk taking. This e⁄ect of asset risk taking increases re￿-
nancing risk. On the other hand, (20) suggests that the bank can lower the creditors￿
threshold by taking more risk. This e⁄ect of asset risk taking decreases re￿nancing
risk.
7 Welfare Analysis
Let us reconsider the impact of transparency on welfare incorporating that banks
react to the level of transparency by choosing accordingly the level of asset risk.























Thus, the marginal impact of changes of the level of transparency on welfare are the
same as in the version of the model where ￿ is exogenous. Therefore the results
23established in Proposition 4 above apply with no change. In particular, maximal
transparency is not socially optimal.
Our assumption that the bank￿ s objectives are perfectly aligned with those of
society provides a basis for arguing against any need for regulation: competitive
pressure leads banks to choose the socially optimal level of transparency as well as
the socially optimal level of asset risk. However, the equilibrium of the banking
sector may have welfare implications beyond its direct e⁄ects on the welfare of banks￿
creditors. In particular, the failure of a bank may have social costs beyond the costs
it imposes on its creditors. For example, depriving some agents of bank￿ s services
may lead to a misallocation of savings and investments, or may constrain the credit
available to borrowers in the real sector. Moreover, banks￿investments may generate
social returns in addition to private returns. Also, bank failures may be contagious
and lead to a credit crunch. The existence of these externalities may misalignment
of the objectives of banks and those of society.
Consider a social welfare function ^ W ￿ that accounts for these externalities,
^ W
￿(") = W
￿(") ￿ F(1 ￿ E(p(￿
￿))):
In this expression, the term F(1￿E(p(￿￿))); with F > 0; captures the external social
cost of a banks￿failures, as e.g. in Freixas, L￿rÆnth and Morrison (2007).
Since dW ￿=d" = @W=@"; as shown above, we have











Since W ￿ increases and ￿￿ decreases with " on (0;a=b) by Propositions 4 and 5, then
the RHS of (21) is strictly increasing on (0;a=b). Furthermore, around " = a=b the
￿rst term on the RHS is zero but the second term is positive. Hence, when the social
cost of bank failures are taken into account, social welfare ^ W ￿ increases with " beyond
a=b: That is, when we account for the social cost of bank failures, the socially optimal
level of transparency is smaller than when only the private interests of creditors are
taken into account; in particular, it becomes more likely that the socially optimal
level of transparency is the minimal one. This result is summarized in Proposition 7.
Proposition 7. If bank failures have negative social externalities, in addition to
their direct e⁄ect on creditors payo⁄s, then the socially optimal level of transparency
is below the optimal level when only the interest of creditors are taken into account.
24The policy implications of Proposition 7 are strong: to the extent that bank
failures call for transparency regulation, this regulation should result in a more opaque
rather than a more transparent banking system.
8 A Numerical Example
Despite its apparent complexity, our model is parsimonious in that the primitives
are just the liquidation cost, ￿, the fraction of active creditors, h, and the return
function, R(￿). It is not obvious which range of values for ￿ we should postulate
since in practice the liquidation value may depend upon the realized state (it may
be low if it is the result of a ￿resale in a recession, but large if the asset is traded
in a booming market) and on the nature of the speci￿c asset (e.g., loans to high-
tech start ups may have a low liquidation value, whereas prime mortgage loans may
have a high one). As for the fraction of active creditors, we may identify it with the
share of short-term debt to banks￿total external debt or total liabilities, which also
varies wildly. We therefore postulate values for these parameters that we deem as
reasonable, but certainly there are other interesting values to try.
In our numerical example we set up ￿ = 2h = 3=4; and postulate a linear return
function, R(￿) = ￿: Note that h < ￿; and









￿(1 ￿ ￿) > 1;
so that
Q(￿) > 1 > ￿ > h > 0;
holds as required.
Using the values of ￿ and h; we calculate ￿ and ￿. Then we use these values and
the function R we calculate the equilibrium threshold t￿; the values a and b; and the
optimal level of transparency "￿ = a=b: Substituting these values in we obtain the
welfare function W("￿;￿):Assuming that the optimal level of transparency, "￿ = a=b;
satis￿es "￿ < "(￿); we calculate the maximizer of W("￿;￿); to obtain ￿￿ ￿ 0:64738.
We then use the value of ￿￿ to calculate "￿ ￿ 0:022112: The bound ￿ " when the level
of asset risk is ￿￿ can be readily calculated as ￿ " ￿ 0:24122 > "￿. If the feasible levels
25of asset risk satisfy ￿ < ￿￿ < ￿ ￿; and are not too far from ￿￿; then equilibrium would
be unique for a broad range of values of " around "￿.
9 Conclusion
Our main conclusion is that maximal bank transparency is not socially optimal.
Moreover, in a competitive banking sector transparency may need to be regulated
only when there are social costs or social externalities associated to bank failures;
when this is the case regulation is required to reduce the level of transparency over
the level that is socially optimal in the absence of these externalities. In addition,
asset risk taking increases with the level of transparency above and around the socially
optimal level. (The relation between risk taking and transparency is ambiguous for
levels of transparency su¢ ciently below the social optimal.) As for the sign of the
impact of transparency on re￿nancing risk, it is negative given the asset￿ s risk, but it
is ambiguous if we account for its indirect e⁄ect via risk taking.
That the socially optimal level of transparency is interior results from optimally
trading o⁄ the opposing e⁄ects induced by changes of the level of transparency: for
high levels of transparency, further increasing transparency increases e¢ cient liqui-
dation but also increases risk taking and may increase re￿nancing risk. These e⁄ects
have been used to argue in favor and against increasing bank transparency, and have
rendered an inconclusive debate ￿see Landier and Thesmar 2011. Our model allow
us to put these e⁄ects in perspective, allow us to conclude that calls for maximal
transparency are not justi￿ed, and that rather assessing the socially optimal level of
transparency requires a quantitative exercise.
In our model, the negative externality imposed by the creditors who withdraw
their short-term debt on the creditors who roll over plays a key role. Studying the
e⁄ect of transparency on the agency problem facing bank ￿insiders￿(e.g. its manage-
ment and controlling shareholders) and outside creditors (e.g. short-term creditors
and small investors) seems an interesting topic of future research ￿this line of re-
search is pursue by Vauhkonen (2010). Also important is analysis of the e⁄ects of
transparency on contagion, an issue that is outside the scope of the present paper ￿
see Chen and Hasan (2006) and Giannetti (2007).
2610 Appendix
In this appendix we calculate the function V (s;t) for s;t 2 (1 ￿ ￿ + ";1 ￿ "): As






















For p and t satisfying p ￿ " < t < p + " we have
2"(1 ￿ x(p;￿t)) = 2"
￿
1 ￿
h(t ￿ p + ")
2"
￿
= c + hp;
where










h2 ln(c + hp) + constant.
Assume that s > t. For p 2 (t + ";s + ") equation (4) yields x(p;￿t) = 0: Also,
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:
27Assume that s < t: For p 2 (s ￿ ";t ￿ ") equation (4) yields x(p;￿t) = h: Also
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:
When the signal of the creditor coincides with the threshold, i.e., s = t; then














￿ := ￿[2h + (2 ￿ h)ln(1 ￿ h)](1 ￿ ￿)=h
and
￿ := h + (1 ￿ ￿)ln(1 ￿ h):





which is equation (12) in Section 4.
We show that 0 < ￿ < h. Since 1 > ￿ > h > 0, then (1 ￿ ￿)ln(1 ￿ h) < 0 and







and ￿ = 0 for h = 0; then ￿ > 0:
28We show that ￿ > 0: Since 1 > ￿ > h > 0; then (1 ￿ ￿)=h > 0. Moreover, for
h > 0 we have
@
@h
(2h + (2 ￿ h)ln(1 ￿ h)) = ￿
h + (1 ￿ h)ln(1 ￿ h)
1 ￿ h
< 0:
(Showing that the numerator is positive is analogous to proving that ￿ > 0:) Hence
2h + (2 ￿ h)ln(1 ￿ h) < 0;
and therefore
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